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Mobile Financial Services at the Base of the Pyramid: A Systemic view for 
Cross-Sector Governance and Embedded Innovation 
 
 
 
Mostafa Mohamad, Trevor Wood-Harper, Ronnie Ramlogan 
Manchester Business School 
 
 
Mobile financial services is one of the uprising movements to bank the unbanked by 
integrating philanthropic and business approaches for financial inclusion. In this paper, we 
address how a systemic view help integrate the Philanthropic Initiatives (PI) and the 
Commercial Initiatives (CI) to get a sustainable impact on the unbanked micro-
entrepreneurs. However, each approach has pros and cons as they go along the stages of 
design, deployment, and sustainability. Using the soft system thinking we theorise the Base 
of the Pyramid (BoP) as a business system to mix-up the relatively high start-up 
capabilities of the PI with the relatively sustainable impact of CI. Our mobile money case 
shows that donors, local private enterprises, and multinational corporations follow the BoP 
strategy to develop an online grid that offers a reconciled balanced scorecard for economic 
returns, social benefits and local impact. Such a strategy guarantees flexible, long-term 
investments and facilitate developing innovative financial services. 
 
 
Keywords: BoP, Soft System Thinking, Value chain, Embedded Innovation, Financial Inclusion, 
Mobile Money 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Poverty and disenfranchising from the financial system stays one of the humanity’s lasting 
challenges (Chambers, 1983; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). In response, the interest of donors 
and enterprises in using market-based strategies have increased to enfranchise the poor micro-
entrepreneurs and link them to the financial system (Hulme & Arun, 2009; UNCTAD, 2011; 
Yunus, 2003). Despite the growing trend toward these approaches, critiques are still rising 
and convincing (Copestake, 2007; Jaiswal, 2008; Karnani, 2007; Morduch et al., 2009). 
However, the expansion of mobile devices and other forms of Information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) facilitated inter-organizational communication, universal 
access to multistakeholders (Heeks, 2010), and creates a networked society (Castells, 2007 & 
2011). In the mobile financial services, Philanthropic Initiatives  (PI) and the Commercial 
Initiatives (CI) run independently of one another, because the economic goals of the latter are 
irreconcilable and sometimes conflicting with the social goals of the former (London & 
Anupindi, 2011). Getting both approaches compatible may contribute to achieving sustainable 
development with wider outreach (Kelly, 2009; Hart, 2011; London, 2011). The “Base of the 
Pyramid” (BoP) is candidate business system that explains how this synergy could take place 
(Prahalad, 2010; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). “What insights, then, does the BoP lens offer 
for enhancing that synergy between the PI and the CI?” 
 
To address this research enquiry, our chapter concerns first with comparing the PI and CI and 
their underpinning business systems. In doing so, we draw upon the recent literature from the 
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mobile financial services to conceptualize the system design, deployment, sustainability in 
both types. Then we examine how the BoP lens better integrate the pros of both systems alone 
the three stages of system development. We see this study as an essential move toward 
highlighting the broader inquiry of “how can we develop market-based business systems that 
serve the poor?”.  
As this research addresses a socioeconomic complex phenomenon, an interpretive qualitative 
approach has been adopted (Myers, 2013). Our data have been collected from “e-Masary”, a 
case of mobile money in Egypt. Using the BoP business system we provide analysis of 
different Philanthropic and business networks in the e-Masary and how these networks 
prompt to integrate in a new business form to bank the unbanked Egyptians estimated to be 
80% of the  population. Semi-structured interviews, focus groups, field visits and archival 
studies are the data collection methods used to provide an extensive answer to the research 
enquiry (Bryman, 1989). Template analysis was also used to interpret the huge amount of data 
into the key findings (King, 2004). 
 
Following Soft System Methodology (SSM) (Chekland, 2013), we start our chapter by 
revisiting the challenges of banking the unbanked (such as investment and profitability, 
digital infrastructure and mobile-based supply chains, regulations and the overall regulatory 
legal frameworks) to frame the problem situation. Then in the second section, we provide a 
body of gray literature, including empirical cases of mobile financial services in order to 
build-up a candidate conceptual framework based on which we explain the motivation for 
integration between both of the PI and the CI in our targeted e-Masary case study. In the third 
section, we discuss our theorization of the BoP as a business system. Afterward, we discuss 
the e-Masary case in depth to draw our templates and study results. In section five, we show 
the research findings the results of considering the BoP business system as a lens for cross-
sector governance and embedded innovation. The last section, offers a conclusion, including 
potential contribution, research limitations, and future recommendation. 
 
 
FINANCING THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID:  
About 2.6 billion people, 70% of the population in the developing countries, are 
disenfranchised from the financial system clarifies that banking is simply not a mass market 
proposition (World databank, 2011). Those people live in misery without proper food, shelter 
and education. If they got access to microcredit, they would be able to create microenterprises 
and set aside some money on each pay day a part of the due amount and its interest (Mas, 
2011). Such micro-savings would improve their livelihood and their ability to manage their 
cash flows more simply as well as to secure stable daily food consumption for their families 
along seasonal income fluctuations (Demirguc-Kunt, 2008; Duncombe, 2006). They would 
also be able to use this money to pay for their children’s education, invest in fridge to store 
their dairy or buy hay to feed their livestock. In addition, they would be able to amass assets 
to bulwark themselves from unexpected live shocks such as diseases or work related 
problems. It is undeniable that such practices may help them self-funding their 
microenterprise one deposit at a time, rather than going through the microcredit cycle again (I. 
e. Paying high interest-rate charges one loan repayment at a time) (Beck et al., 2007; Matin et 
al., 2002). 
 
The ability to transfer micropayments safe and cheaply to remote individuals (e.g. Family 
members living in villages) or organizations (FMCGs and utilities) is also one of the benefits 
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that micro-entrepreneurs would gain, if they get access to the financial system (Hughes & 
Lonie, 2007). Further, they could receive international remittances from migrant relatives or 
companies they supply in other towns without going to the physical branches of financial 
service providers (Ivatury & Mas, 2008). Based on the above discussion, we can argue that all 
of these financial services are complementary and have mutual impacts on the livelihood of 
the poor people specially the micro-entrepreneurs. Once they get access to one of these 
services, they become more willing to pay for the other financial services as long as they are 
packaged in a way that is relevant to their needs, sized appropriately, and delivered 
conveniently (Hulme & Thankom, 2011). 
 
The success of financial service providers in Asia (e.g. Grameen, SKS and SMART Money), 
in Africa (e.g. M-PESAand Celpay) and in Latin America (e.g. Banco Sol and No Boarders) 
have built a massive network of retail agents serving villagers (Mendoza & Vick, 2010). 
Those agents are usually non-branch licensed physical outlets such mobile retails or grocery 
kiosks who conduct credit evaluations and collect repayments. Despite this potential for 
micro-entrepreneurs and to the whole poor, service providers see it as unprofitable and needs 
huge infrastructures and regulatory frameworks (Mas, 2011).  
 
Financial Service Providers attribute the “unprofitability” of the poor market to low balances, 
small amounts per transaction and seasonality of transactions (Cull et al., 2009). They doubt 
the poor’s credit worthy without sources of collaterals (Morduch, 1999). Then it is surprising 
to find U.S 50 worth products such as a bottle of Coca Cola, a mobile prepaid card, a small jar 
of vitamin-full yogurt and a sachet of shampoo in almost all the village stores in the 
developing countries. Probably Financial Service Providers neglect so many customers who 
might want to pay for affordable financial services as they do for a bottle of Coca Cola
1
. This 
controversial question is highlighted by Hamada (2010) as the main character of the first 
paradigm shift in microfinance. There are two paradigm shifts in microfinance: the first 
paradigm started in the second half of the 1980s, when microfinance shifted from Agri-credit 
or microcredit subsidized by government and/or donors funding small farmers to 
microenterprise finance via market-based approaches. This paradigm focused on overcoming 
the high transaction costs and risks because of information asymmetries (Zeller & Meyer, 
2002); the second paradigm shift emerged in the middle of the 2000s when CGAP called for 
building inclusive financial sectors in the developing countries (Hamada, 2010). The latter 
resulted in three domains micro, meso, and macro (Duncombe & Boateng, 2009). The macro-
level includes state legislative and policy frameworks, while the micro-level includes 
financial service providers (banks and non-bank) that offer services to the poor. In the middle, 
the meso-level that includes the financial system’s basic financial infrastructure and its range 
of services (e.g. Microfinance mechanisms and ICT application). In this respect, it is 
important to explore how service providers employ operating models suitable for the poor. 
 
Building suitable “infrastructure” is the second challenge faces the financial service 
providers targeting the poor. For the poor, money is a physical value of needs (e.g. Food, 
shelter and cloths) whilst for the rich it is an electronic value where financial institutions 
process accounting information. Electronic banking bridged the physical cloud with the 
electronic cloud using Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), Visa cards, and Points-of-Sale 
(PoS) terminals in retails (Lyman et al., 2006). In doing so, electronic banking enables the 
                                                 
1See Robinson (2001), and Armendariz and Morduch (2005) that studied the profitability mechanism in the 
market-based financial services for the poor. 
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rich people to use money that is already uploaded to their bank accounts in sort of 
information. 
 
Conversely, the poor people get paid in cash that needs to be transformed to the electronic 
format. Financial service providers think that the poor needs too many branches to deposit 
their money in an electronic form which is unprofitable considering the huge fixed costs for 
building new branches and recruiting suitable staff. Mass (2011) agrees with that the majority 
of financial service providers are still following direct distribution model while many other 
service providers (e.g. Utilities and railway companies) adopt the multi-distribution model. 
Whilst financial service providers see physical branches as the main challenge, the other 
providers partnered with third-party like mobile operators to facilitate prepaid billing 
platforms (Barnes, 2002).  
 
Financial service providers will reach the huge market at the BoP only if they found a way to 
eliminate costs. The alliance between Grameen Bank, Grameenphone, developed a network of 
“Phone Ladies” in Bangladesh to operator “Village Phones”. The phone ladies are borrowers 
who get equal to US 200 dollar loan from Grameen Bank to subscribe to Grameen phone. 
Once they subscribe, they get trained on how to operate mobile phones and how to charge 
others with a profitable price. In April 2012, the village phones exceeded 471,423 phones 
operating in 297,079 villages around Bangladesh and serve 162,220,762 clients (Grameen 
Bank, 2012). This program has been replicated in Nigeria, Uganda, and Rwanda (Islam, 2005; 
Keogh et al., 2005). Given that some of the Phone Ladies have decades of experience with the 
bank, they represent a very cheap distribution network that achieved revenues of nearly $30 
billion and net profits approaching $600 million by the end of 2011 (Grameen Bank, 2012). 
Banco do Brasilacquired a network of 8,600 retail agents equipped with point-of sales readers 
to upload cash into electronic accounts (CGAP, 2010). These retails sell white-goods in the 
Brazilian villages and hamlets serving 1,461,850 unbanked clients including 528,792 active 
clients of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) (CGAP, 2011).  
 
Despite that financial service providers in developing countries have begun turning fixed 
costs into variable costs and use new channels; they are often hampered by “regulation” 
(Weber & Darbellay, 2010). M-PESA in Kenya is an example of how governmental 
regulations may facilitate (or hinder) the success of mobile-based financial services. The 
Kenyan banks claimed that their regulated services have been overwhelmed by M-PESA who, 
within two years of operation, had 13,142,550 in comparison to 8,600,258 existing bank 
customers (CGAP, 2011). Regulators focus on the aggregation of funds through receiving 
deposits from the poor than the rich people while offering the same interest rate (Ivatury & 
Mas, 2008). Bankers are restricted by operational regulations that govern how they develop 
their products, distribution channels, information systems and management structure. 
Altogether affect their ability to innovate and drive up costs and in turn decrease their 
profitability in such market (Mas, 2011). In Kenya, for instance, bank branches are subject to 
periodical physical inspection by an authorized representative of the central bank. In case of 
service termination, they are also required to give six months“closing notice”to the central 
bank (Mas, 2011). It does not mean M-PESA runs free of risks. Ivatury & Mas (2008) 
reported lots of operational problems
2
 concerning the possibility of data leaks at the retail 
agents and low level of security in the rural kiosks. However, evidence showed that the 
                                                 
2
Examples of the problems and other associated risks are credit risk, liquidity risk, reputational risk and 
potential for money laundering. See Ivatury and Mas (2008). 
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Central Bank of Kenya dedicated all efforts not to organise M-PESA as a bank,  but to operate 
outside the casual banking rules (Hayes & Westrup, 2011). 
 
Concluding this section, we think that bankers and traditional financial service providers 
serving the poor twist the regulators’ arms with the risks associating the new models, rather 
than innovating new business models (including new distribution channels) or even 
improving their competitive advantage and sustainability in the poor market. In the next 
section, we explore how pervious projects of mobile financial services tackled the above 
mentioned challenges following either the PI or the CI. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: BUSINESS SYSTEMS IN FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
 
In their seminal work Linstone & Meltsner (1984) refer to three stages to develop technology-
based business system; design, deployment, and sustainability stages. While the first one 
focuses on finding the business paths (including value proposition and value network, value 
architecture and financing), the latter stages focus on how to put this design into action (Al-
Dubai & Avison, 2010). The “design stage” explain the business vision, value chain, and key 
performance indicators (Porter, 1985). It ends with a detailed feasibility and an audit plan to 
whether or not to commence the deployment stage. The “deployment stage” involves 
deploying the business system, integrating with networks, resolving political conflicts among 
the relevant real-real stakeholders. The “sustainability stage” concerns with removing the gap 
between the designed business system and daily business processes to assure the system 
sustainability (Linstone, 1981). 
 
The previous projects for mobile financial services confirm that PI and CI are the main roots 
of business systems (Simanis & Hart, 2009; London & Anupindi, 2010 & 2011). PI adopted 
in financial inclusion programs targeting poor micro-entrepreneurs in which, the 
implementing partner acts as a network engineer. This partner does not join the value chain 
nor perform the change in the business system, rather, facilitates the changes necessary to 
stimulate the demand for products/services as well as for increasing the supply of higher 
performing local subcontractors. In the CI, private enterprises act as the network engineer. 
They integrate with the value chain and develop growth strategies through new competitive 
opportunities beyond the traditional market (Simanis & Hart, 2009). Investments are viewed 
through a rational (financial) perspective and need to be complemented with sustainable 
business relationships and transferable capabilities.  
 
Recently, the rate of donors and international aid organizations counted for 73% of the 
worldwide efforts toward poverty alleviation (MicroRate, 2012). These institutions are mostly 
funded by mega donors such as the USAID, Swiss Aid organization, Germany’s 
Gesellschaftfür Technische Zusammenarbeit, the Department for International Development 
in the UK, the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and different other 
development agencies and foundations (Bauchet et al., 2011; London & Anupindi, 2011). 
Such donors struggled to develop their existing value chains for integrating micro-
entrepreneurs into the domestic and international financial markets, as well as providing a 
wide range of financial services for the poor (Helms, 2006).  
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The CIs founded in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, looking for innovative sources of finance via 
new value chains and non-traditional opportunities to pull the unbanked poor in these value 
chains (Mas, 2011). With almost no prior knowledge or expertise in the unbanked 
environment, these CIs face a challenging journey to start and scale-up their innovative 
business models (Valadez & Buskirk, 2011). 
 
 
Philanthropic Business Systems: 
 
In this section we explain the three stages (i.e. Design, deployment and sustainability stages) 
that the PI follows to develop their business system as shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
 Design stage. This stage leverages the initial experience and builds partnerships via 
two steps. First, the donor decides to invest resources in a targeted industry (such as 
agriculture, handicrafts, fast moving consumer goods microfinance or mobile 
telecommunication) or Subsector (such as dairy, livestock breeding or micro-lending) and call 
organizations for bids (London & Anupindi, 2011). 
 
In doing so, the donor issues “Request for Proposal” and “Requests for Assistance”. Each 
state the general objectives (including performance indicators) required to improve the 
competitiveness of the chosen sector.  
 
FIGURE1 
Philanthropic Business Systems 
 
 
Source: the author’s literature review 
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The USAID-Zambia, for instance, sponsored the Production, Finance, and Technology 
(PROFIT) project to help unbanked farmers collect payment from cotton ginners and food 
processors via mobile banking agents like airtime dealers, gas stations, or grocery retails. 
Further, it enables them to pay for supplies (e.g. Veterinaries and fertilizers’ providers) 
against purchases of inputs (Ducker & Payne, 2010). 
At the design stage, USAID-Zambia identified the country-level needs as wider access to the 
poor markets, enhanced value added and production technologies, increased financial and 
business development services, improved enabling environment for growth and infrastructure 
for electronic payment platforms. Then USAID/ Zambia requested proposals from third party 
or implementing partner to address these issues. The selection metrics include the 
implementing partner’s ability to increase the customer outreach, increasing value of per unit 
production of harvested lands, and increasing number of female workers in producer 
organizations (Snodgrass & Woller, 2006, p. 6). Further, candidates had to identify the 
resources they dedicated to the project, their potential partners, and their action plans 
(including yearly activities, budgets, and expected outcomes). Above all, IPs had to have long 
experience and enough knowledge of the problems and challenges face the poor farmers. 
Potential partnership is an asset for the selected implementing partner who identifies the key 
organizations and individuals enlisted to execute the project and the business model to be 
implemented. For instance, the Cooperative League of the United States of America 
(CLUSA) has been selected as the implementing partner for the PROFIT project due to its 
five decades of experience in developing countries and extended worldwide network of 
partners. 
 
 Deployment Stage. Once the implementing partner is selected, they act according to 
the presented plan, including detailed metrics with measurable objectives. Because the PIs are 
usually short-term, there is no chance for trialling and learning from mistakes (Woolcock, 
1999). So the implementing partner and its network of allies are responsible for educating, 
transferring knowledge, and help creating social capital among bottom line performers 
(Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). They are also responsible, in some cases, for providing 
technical and/or financial inputs. 
 
One of the main sources of investment and support is private partners who, with the help of 
the implementing partner, get access to local markets to a wide range of products/services 
(Arora & Romijn, 2012). However, such partners might mislead the implementing partner and 
misinterpret the poor needs either intentionally or unintentionally. In some cases, they might 
exercise monopoly, and even impose a new demand for unneeded products rather than 
removing the poor misery (Jaiswal, 2008; Karnani, 2007). This justifies why the PI usually 
includes multiple layers of private companies to prevent monopolies and to assure ethical 
trading.  
 
Continuing the PROFIT project, the CLUSA enhanced the idea of a “service provider” 
through agriculture retails and cotton industry and also strengthened the “buyer-supplier 
relationships” via a central payment platform. Apart of the technology side, the CLUSA 
found that farmers were often unaware of available resources. So, the CLUSA facilitated 
SMS-based marketing campaign via Celpay and Mobile Transactions Zambia Limited 
(MTZL) (Snodgrass & Woller, 2006). Thus, for instance, enabled suppliers such as 
veterinaries and fertilizers’ providers to send promotions to cattle farmers. To build the 
payment platform, The CLUSA had negotiations with the Bank of Zambia to consider the 
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approval of branchless banking and money transfer services. Later, CLUSA partnered with 
MTZL and Celpay to complete the buyer-supplier circle and activate the electronic payment 
that save the farmers travelling costs want to buy their agricultural inputs.  
 
 Sustainability stage. At this stage donors and their implementing partner transfer all 
the required resources and experience to the targeted sector in the poor market, aiming to 
increase their competitiveness (Lal & Myint, 1998). This requires operational effectiveness in 
each of its segments, coordination of transactions among actors across the value chain, and 
supportive business environment (Miller & Da Silva, 2007, p. 97). Participation of local 
producers proved to be also essential for supportive business environment in the poor market 
(Mayoux, 2003). 
During the design stage, the PIs set the key performance indicators for monitoring project 
effectiveness and translate them into “process-related metrics” and “outcome-related 
metrics”. The process-related metrics assess how much intervention (including resources, 
efforts, knowledge and experience) required and the later tracks the result of this intervention.  
 
The process-related metrics take different formats, according to the pre-set indicators. In 
agricultural projects, for instance, the process matrices include the number of farmers trained, 
number of training, exhibitions, and groups formed (London & Anupindi, 2011). Epstein & 
Crane (2007, p 22) developed a massive process-related metrics for micro-lending in Ghana 
which includes four sections:  
 
1) Leadership indicators (e.g. Average years of experience of MFI senior 
executives and loan officers);  
2) Strategy indicators such as amount of loan portfolio, loan size (average & 
range) and credit ratings of clients; Structure indicators like number of loan 
officers, % of decisions made by loan officers, and amount of group vs. 
individual loans; and 
3) System indicators such as dollars invested in training (client & employee), 
number of clients per loan officer, % of income clients are required to save, 
frequency of payments and quality of IT and credit monitoring systems. 
Simultaneously, these assess the magnitude of the common platforms being 
developed. The outcome-related metrics must be consistent with the 
process-related metrics
 3
.  
 
The problem with both types of matrices is that they are internally developed and monitored. 
In order to cover this gap, leaders of PIs need to outsource this task to independent an auditing 
company to evaluate the results against the pre-set performance indicators. The reason for 
such practice is to help donors fairly assess the project’s success (Copestake, 2003). 
 
PROFIT project aimed to collect sector-specific market information and to train farmers via 
SMS. In doing so, CLUSA developed a process-related metric that reflects the number of 
services available on the system and the number of trainees using each service (London & 
Anupindi, 2011, p. 4). The outcome-related metrics based on better farmer knowledge of 
                                                 
3
 There are comprehensive matrices that include both of the process-related metrics and outcome-related 
metrics such as Balanced Scorecard by Kaplan and Norton (1996), Global Reporting Initiative, Market Efficiency 
Audit by George (1996), Wealth of Nations Triangle Index by Sullivan (2002) and social reporting by CGAP and 
MIX (2012). 
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market opportunities and cultivation practices, and increased use of appropriate tillage service 
(London & Anupindi, 2011, p. 4). 
Despite that fact that, PROFIT project aimed at“scaling-up” with an extensive network of 
qualified agents, only 46% of the clients became active and the average sales of agricultural 
inputs and other related products is 15% less than the expected average (USAIDa, 2010). This 
reflects the service lagging and limited demand. In addition, some suppliers such as 
“Cropserve Zambia limited” who joined CLUSA’s network to provide farmers with chemical 
inputs failed to expand their agents’ network into important areas such as Mkushi (Sebstad & 
Krivoshlykova, 2009). This example shows how it was challenging for some partners to scale 
up and keep the extended supply chain. It also emphasizes that fixing such a problem in 
Cropserve requires more investment in the ICT, technology infrastructure and the whole 
components of the value chain (London & Anupindi, 2011, p. 6). 
 
 
Commercial Business System 
 
In this section we explain how private institutions develop a commercial business system 
through three stages of design, deployment, and sustainability as shown in the below Figure 2. 
 
  
       FIGURE 2 
     Commercial Business System 
 
 
 
  
  Source: the author’s literature review 
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 Design Stage. At this stage, private enterprise exercise the role of the implementing 
partner to explore new market opportunities and seek socially oriented partners that help 
develop innovative solutions to the poor’s critical problems (Yunus, 2004).  The CI usually 
aims to develop nontraditional value chains to create competitive advantages and achieve 
long-term economic benefits (Porter & Kramer, 2006). These new chains usually require 
additional investments that are not risk free. For instance, the risks of getting involved in 
community conflicts where some elites try to control the settings within which other 
disenfranchised groups act and interact (Arora & Romijn, 2012). Other risks arise from lack 
of awareness of regulatory rules and government interference in the market. These together 
make working with the poor, a new venture with uncertain economic benefits (Wilson & 
Wilson, 2006). To overcome such risks, CI needs support from various non-traditional 
partners like Multinational Corporations (MNCs), non-profit NGOs, or government.  
 
The challenge is, however, how enterprises work with the poor and these non-traditional 
partners if they lack partnering skills.  In 2000, Grameen DANONE Food Limited (GDFL), a 
50-50 joint venture between the Grameen Bank Group and the French Group DANONE, was 
founded to bring daily healthy nutrition to low income people in Bangladesh.  Over the last 
three decades, DANONE has elaborated many humanitarian initiatives with social missions. 
DANONE perceived a business prospect in employing local ladies, but they have low level on 
indigenous knowledge and expertise to craft a suitable strategy. Trying to fill this gap, 
Grameen Bank offered support to DANONE working directly with Grameen ladies. By 
agreement, Grameen Bank grants, micro-loans to farmers to raise the cows needed to produce 
the milk locally. Then local carriers transport this milk to small factory to be sterilized before 
being distributed door-to-door by Grameen ladies.  
 
Nontraditional partners such as the NGOs and the local communities are often skeptical in 
working with for-profit enterprises, and therefore put more emphasis on a consensus of the 
general mission as a condition to their collaboration. So the private enterprises spend long 
time attracting them.  
 
 Deployment stage. During this stage, enterprises conduct radical experimentations to 
their business models and monitor the outcomes to revise inputs (McLaughlin & Jordan, 
1999). “A series of small experiments minimizes risk and maximizes learning, [this is] not 
intuitive, but involves the ability (and intention) to make changes if the first chosen path turns 
out unsuccessful” (Yunus et al., 2010, p. 8). Enterprises who pilot their business model to 
gain wider understanding and polish their skills at the lowest cost. Once the pilot shows 
sufficient economic return, the CIs are able to scale-up their investments. Solution design and 
deployment have to be conducted iteratively until a robust business model is found or the 
initiative is abandoned.  
 
Safaricom in Kenya launched its M-Pesa money transfers dealing with retailers who merely 
sell airtime minutes. Retailers lacked the minimum degree of education and management 
skills. In turn, they failed to use technology and to appropriately record real-time transactions. 
So, Safaricom partnered with the “Top Image”, training specialists, to training their 17,000 
extension officers and lead retailers. Once the pilot succeeded, M-Pesa extended it to other 
banking services (e.g. Micro-savings and micro-insurance) using their extensive retail outlets. 
 
Grameen Bank’s founder, Mohammad Yunus, spent a long time with the villagers together as 
a community: in the rice fields, in farming projects, in afternoon conversations at roadside tea 
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stalls, and in late-evening dinners and debates. By working together and learning from one 
another, Yunus’s and the villagers’ unique knowledge, insights and perspectives came into 
creative collision, sowing the seeds for a profitable and scalable village banking model that 
neither could have conceived of independently (Simanis & Hart, 2009). The huge economic 
potential encouraged the bank to replicate this pilot in different geographical areas which 
increased the outreach to seven million women borrowers across some 75,000 villages of 
Bangladesh, with annual loan disbursement exceeding 800 million dollars.  
 
In contrast to the philanthropic business system, the commercial one emphasizes testing new 
business models. Since they are directly engaged in the value chain, they need to create skills 
and capabilities to bridge the gaps identified. Given the inherent risk in working in an 
unfamiliar context, it treads cautiously, using pilots to learn and test the initial design. An 
enterprise may choose to work with other partners (private, government, or donor); however, 
the nature, viability, and usefulness of such partnerships are also tested during the piloting 
process. In the CIs, corporations work as a network maestro who builds dynamic capabilities, 
innovates business model, and capture a portion of the playing field, rather than maintain 
control over partners to achieve their own interests. 
 
 Sustainability stage. During this stage, the private businesses evaluate the feasibility 
of creating a competitive advantage in the existing markets and develop the essential dynamic 
capabilities for scaling-up. Private business creates dynamic capabilities by integrating new 
resources from the community and non-traditional partners, by transforming resources to their 
staff, and by acquiring new technology to deliver a unique value to the community and micro-
entrepreneurs (Tashman & Marano, 2010). London (2011) explains three approaches for 
scaling and sustainability; the first is “scaling-up” in which enterprise co-generate 
competitive advantage with an expanding set of partnerships; the second is “scaling-deep” in 
which the enterprise offers new products and services for the same customers in an existing 
geographical market; the final is “scaling-wide” in which the enterprise try to create new 
value proposition within the same set of products or services to satisfy new customers in new 
market.  
 
In the Philippines, “Globe Telecom” partnered with “Smart Communications” to leverage the 
ICT network that enabled them to create a source of competitive advantage and to scale-up. 
Globe Telecom offers a service that allows customers to send and receive money via a mobile 
phone. The service is called G-Cash and facilitates money remittance and many other 
transactions with just a text message or SMS. Through this innovation, the cost of money 
transfers decreased substantially and access to transfer services for remittances extended to 
geographically remote areas (Mendoza & Vick, 2010). On the other hand, Smart 
Communications introduced an over-the-air payment system for mobile phones, which has 
many advantages compared to traditional payment systems. It allows a retailer to load a 
customer’s airtime electronically and therefore helps minimize physical product distribution 
costs. Another advantage is that product distribution becomes faster, more efficient and more 
secure and enables consumers to reload and purchase airtime even in remote rural areas 
(Mendoza & Vick, 2010).  
 
Concluding the above discussion, during the design stage the commercial business aims at 
leverage new market opportunities. Then deployment proceeds cautiously, using pilots to 
assess the solution design. A successful pilot demonstrates the viability of the business 
opportunity, helps the enterprise develop skills and capabilities, and generates a competitive 
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advantage. A deliberate process of business development helps ensure the sustainability of the 
initiative in its existing market. It also creates an opportunity to gain more capabilities and 
essential for scaling. As business environments are dynamic, sustainability is at risk.  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BASE OF THE PYRAMID BUSINESS SYSTEM 
 
 
The Base of the Pyramid (BoP) is a market approach that sheds the light on how cross-sector 
collaboration and governance could occur to bank the unbanked and alleviate their poverty 
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). In this section, we examine how our system thinking 
theorization will offer a new insight for the BoP strategy and brave the road for mixing the 
advantages of the PI and CI business systems.  
 
Advancing the BoP strategy created a crossroad for business strategy and poverty alleviation 
(Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Prahalad, 2007). The BoP represents four billion people live on less 
than $3,000 per capita purchasing power and primarily run their microenterprises in the 
informal economy (Hammond et al., 2007). The BoP literature provides a convincing 
argument for bankers to view the unbanked as a missed market opportunity full of consumers, 
producers, and entrepreneurs (Akula, 2008). It also offers a vision of how microentrepreneurs 
develop viable business systems through the right mix of mindsets, resources, supply chains 
and collaborations (London & Hart, 2004; Seelos & Mair, 2007). Other generations of the 
BoP strategy have been developed such as BoP2.0, 3.0 & 4.0.  
 
The second generation, BoP 2.0, offers a cross-collaboration system where multinational 
corporations and the local community co-create a fortune than to find a fortune at untapped 
market segment. This close intimacy helps both parties to co-invent new value propositions 
and deliver a win-win situation (Simanis & Hart, 2009). The recent political and economic 
reforms (e.g. Arab Spring) showed a decreasing role of nations-states in the economic and 
social wellbeing, including poverty alleviation (Al Gore, 2013). Karnani (2009) questioned 
the role of the governments in creating efficient market conditions that protect the poor from 
unethical marketing practices. The central bank of Kenya and the minister of finance 
facilitated the expansion of M-Pesa beyond the strict banking regulations in the country and 
issued customised security and privacy rules (Hayes & Westrup, 2011). The government 
interference helps collecting more information about the community’s physical and social 
needs and also motivates building relevant consumer protection agencies (Uppal & Malik, 
2009). In response, a third wave, or BoP3.0 started to enhance the trilogy between the 
multinational corporations, community, and the state (Arora & Romijn, 2009 & 2012; London 
& Hart, 2011).  
 
The BoP4.0, however, emphasises on the interplay of the NGOs (Including the international 
aid organizations) in the public-private partnership in which private enterprises (local and 
multi-national), and the local community work together toward reaching social objectives by 
product of achieving economic returns (Prahalad, 2009; Simanis & Hart, 2008). These 
intermediaries interpret the points of view of MNCs, the state, and community and catalyse 
the deployment of new business systems (Arora & Romijn, 2009 & 2012). This recent version 
of the BoP, helps performing what is “right” for the stakeholders, co-creates and pilots 
business models in deep dialogue with the poor (London & Anupindi, 2012). In turn, a 
socially embedded competitive advantage gets created and a mutual value creation can be 
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(London, 2009). The BoP4.0 calls for public-private partnership, where the public offers top-
down philanthropic business system and the private develop a bottom-up commerce business 
system. In Figure 3 shown below, we present a systemic comparison between both 
approaches in terms of inputs (floor) and outputs (ceiling).  
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Philanthropic Business System Vs Commercial Business System 
 
 
Summarized from the literature review 
 
 
The philanthropic business system, in one hand, has a solid floor. Donors and/or governments 
replicate the design of previous financial inclusion projects. They invest a certain amount of 
resources following preset policies adopted from the best practices in these projects. Its 
ceiling is usually well established in terms of time, investment amount, and evaluation 
metrics. The predefined list of resources gets transferred within that time frame to achieve 
well-known performance measures. However, the sustainability of such a system remains less 
certain because it aims for wider impact, but in a short period of time. It might also tie the 
microenterprenures into a closed loop of poverty when s/he relies on aids to run a business 
(Hulme & Arun, 2011).  
 
The commercial business system, on the other hand, starts with careful steps and minimum 
risk. In doing so, private businesses invest less money and take small-scale experiments. 
Despite their lower floor, this system relies on continuous testing of co-created indigenous 
business models that result in higher ceiling. In many cases, the enterprise’s design doom to 
fail and its pilots may be deemed unworthy of further investment. However, a substantial 
long-term impact is usually assured once feasibility is managed and resources are dedicated. 
Private enterprises usually set a strategic plan for the way they experiment, design and deploy 
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their business model including sustainability and scalability measures. If the design and 
piloting go well, then an enduring and widespread impact can result. 
The rest of the paper offers a case evidence of how BoP cross-sector collaboration creates an 
inclusive embedded business system, including new distribution channels, value propositions, 
and scaling strategies in the poor market. Such collaboration offers a hybrid of both 
philanthropic and commercial business system and grasps their advantages as shown in the 
figure above. It also helps overcoming the profitability, infrastructure, and regulation 
challenges discussed in the first section. 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH: 
This research follows an interpretative approach and a case study design of the e-Masary 
mobile money initiative in which cross-sector collaboration is an organizational goal to 
improve the financial inclusion as a societal goal. Understanding these objectives requires 
perceiving human sense and action in context (Avison & Malaurent, 2014). We realize both 
issues as two pillars of a socially constructed phenomenon and accordingly we based our 
evidence on the shared meanings, language, documents and reality of its stakeholders (Klein 
& Myers, 1999), and we applied the grounded theory (Glaser, 1978; Urquhart et al., 2010) to 
construct key concepts from this reality.  
 
Our understanding of “social construction” reflects “Socially mediated Idealism” where the 
social world is recreated by the actors with every event, and reality is the accomplishment 
individual sense-making (Ryan et al., 2002). We are concerned with the procedures through 
which the individual actors make sense of “what is going on”. 
 
E-Masary is one of the biggest such projects ever attempted – 9 cities and more than 18 
million potential users (1.5 million already reached) – the issues related to such a networked 
project are likely to be relevant to the donors and private enterprise networks at macro, micro, 
and meso levels. Given its size, scope, complexity, and diversity, the e-Masary initiative is a 
symbolic exhibition of the issues related to both of cross-sector collaboration and embedded 
models of financial inclusion and it helps interpret the evolution of their meanings as has been 
negotiated by the relevant stakeholders. The data collection methods were archival research, 
semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and electronic samples of Masary’s electronic 
wallet. Table 1, shown below, explains the key sources of data, sampling, and period during 
which data been collected. 
 
The total textual materials count to 61,478 words inserted in NVivo 8
4
 (Gibbs, 2002). The 
final data used for the open coding process consisted of a total of 1654 paragraphs of text. The 
grounded theory approach has been followed to analyse the transcribed data (Glaser, 1978; 
Charmaz, 2003; Urquhart et al., 2010). The iterative coding was the basic tool to link the key 
themes and categories and to pinpoint the key institutions, individuals, and technologies that 
construct the cross-sector collaboration and financial inclusion. At the end, three key themes 
have been found significant “mobile-based balance metrics and align incentives”, “investment 
agility”, and “innovation and competitive advantage”. The following section discusses the 
case of e-Masary and draw examples in relation to the aforementioned themes. 
 
                                                 
4
 NVivo is an electronic tool designed to analyze qualitative data. 
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TABLE 1 
Data Collection Methods 
 Collection 
Methods 
Data Sources Number and Period 
Desk 
Research 
Two databases have been used to reach to the peer reviewed 
journal papers covering the core research issues 
 
1- Business Source Premier (BSP): 
·        Financial Inclusion was of real importance, I launched a search with 
the following criteria:  
 Find all my search terms: Topic "Financial 
Inclusion*". 
 Limiters: Full text, References available and 
Scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals. 
 Source Types: Academic Journals. 
Total of 73 articles 4 
out of which were 
deleted because they 
were either book 
reviews or editorials. 
Period: 
2001 to 2013 
2- Web of Science (WoS): 
 Search for “Financial Inclusion” and “Cross-sector 
Collaboration” in ALL Fields. 
 Limit To: Topics   - Limit To Humanities & Social Science 
Total of 34 articles 2 
out of which do not 
address the developing 
context 
Period: 2001 to 2013 
Interviews  Semi-structured individual interviews (Donner & Tellez, 
2008; Morawczynski & Miscione, 2008) conducted with 
top and middle level managers in the three mobile 
network operators (Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat), 
Masary Corporation, the Social Fund for Development, 
and the Financial Supervisory Authority. 
 The interviews length ranges between 45-90 minutes fully 
recorded with a signed consent of the respondents. 
37 Interviewees 
Period: 
March-May 2011 
Focus 
Groups 
 Focus groups conducted with various stakeholders 
involving a total of 348 individuals (Bloor et al., 2001; 
Wilkinson, 2004). The discussions were taped and fully 
transcribed. 
 Focus groups’ length ranges between 45-90 minutes fully 
recorded with a signed consent of the respondents. 
39 (48 MFIs top 
management and 
officers & 300 mobile 
money users) 
Period: August-Oct 
 2011 
Electronic 
samples 
 Electronic samples (provided by the CCO) from e-Masary 
mobile and internet based systems reflecting issues of 
available services, data flow, performance indicators and 
online loan tracking system. 
41 snapshots 
Period: Sep 2010- Sep 
2012 
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E-MASARY CASE STUDY 
“E” stands for electronic and the word “Masary” stands for money in Arabic language. It is a 
payment service launched by Applications and Payment Systems Development Corporation 
(APSD) in 2007. Later the name APSD has been changed to Masary.Co in 2009. Its key 
product is the mobile wallet, which allows clients to buy credits from general stores and use 
those to transfer money, buy products and services, or pay bills.  
 
In the cash-based economy of Egypt, only 10 percent of 84 million Egyptians have a bank 
account (EFSA, 2011). Masary’s main objective is to improve the financial inclusion of those 
unbanked Egyptians taping on the 118% penetration of mobile technology (Ministry of 
information communication and technology, 2014). In the following section we explain the 
different services and products provided for e-Mary clients who hold Masary’s SIM card.  
 
The first service is “mobile airtime top-up” in which Masary’s customers can visit one of 
Masary’s 2965 outlets to charge their e-wallets and top-up their mobile credit for any of the 
mobile networks (Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat) operating in Egypt. The second service is 
“real-time payment service” in which Masary’s customers can top-up their e-Wallet to pay 
their bills (e.g. Travel tickets, groceries and utilities) and online Games. Moreover, it enables 
customers to charge other electronic payment mediums such as “One Card” and “Cash U”5. In 
addition, customers can use their e-wallet to pay for entertainment websites like 
www.Shofha.com and www.Mazika.com. The third service is “mobile microfinance services” 
that enables MFIs to mobilize their data entry and reporting at low operating cost. It also 
enables active borrowers to upload their loans into e-Masary wallet for three uses: 
 
1) Resell airtime and electronic payment services to the rural communities with mark-up in 
order to achieve a profit margin and secure a stable source of income. 
2) Direct purchase of production inputs or payment for bills. 
3) Transfer credit to other family members or business partners to do (a) or (b). 
4) I-Score service in which e-Masary enables their partner MFIs to trace the credit history 
of existing and potential borrowers. 
 
The fourth service is the money transfer service that Masary.Co offers to subscribers of 
Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat. Through Vodafone the service is called “Vodafone Cash”, 
through mobinil is called “mobicash”, and through Etisalat it is called “Etisalat Floos”. The 
word “Floos” is another synonym of Masary or money in Arabic.  This service operates that 
same as the mobile microfinance loan tracking services, but open for all mobile users than just 
microfinance customers. This service is controlled by the Central Bank of Egypt and the 
Egyptian Financial Regulatory Authority (EFSA) who approved a full regulatory framework 
identifies the maximum and minimum daily transfers, currency, and security controls.  
 
 
Philanthropic Business System in e-MSARY  
 
                                                 
5
 “One card” is a magnetic striped card for e-shopping and internet payment (www.onecard.net). “Cash U” is 
also a prepaid internet payment card (http://www.cashu-egypt.com). 
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In this section we explain the main actors of the philanthropic network and exemplify one of 
its successful initiatives, the Poorest of the Poor Entrepreneurs program (PPE), prior the 
beginning of e-Masary initiative (See Figure 4 that summarises the key actors involved in the 
PPE).The last three decades witnessed numerous financial inclusion programs funded through 
a big list of donors that includes, but not limited to: the United States Aid (USAID), the 
Canadian International Development Agency, UNICEF, Ford Foundation, United Nations 
Development Programme, the Egyptian Swiss Development Fund, Save the Children, 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation, Italian Fund of Egypt, and the European 
Commission MEDA program (PlaNet Finance, 2008). The USAID and the Social Fund for 
Development are the biggest sponsors for the Non-Governmental Microfinance Institutions 
(NGO-MFIs) in Egypt with a 1.2 billion L.E loan portfolio (PlaNet Finance, 2008).  
 
 USAID Egypt finances almost 70% of the MFIs in Egypt. The USAID partners with 
MFIs who have distinguished records of microcredit services. Since 1989, USAID projects 
served 10 million Egyptian microenterprises. USAID follows two schemes for 
microenterprise finance: the banking scheme and the foundation scheme. 
 
The banking model is implemented through the national bank for development and Banque du 
Caire to finance rural and urban microenterprises (EFSA, 2011). USAID’s largest project in 
the country, the Agricultural Production and Credit Project has been facilitated through a 
partnership with the principal bank for development and agricultural credit. To date 775,000 
loans worth over 2 billion EGP have been extended to 305,000 microentrepreneurs with less 
than a 2% default rate. It is estimated that 240,000 job opportunities were created as a result 
of this program (USAID, 2012).  
 
The foundation model was designed to establish private, non-profit, community-based 
organizations to act as microenterprises financial intermediaries (EFSAa, 2010). Via these 
foundations the USAID introduced a variety of financial inclusion programs. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Key actors in e-Masary’s philanthropic business system  
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Source: the author’s field visits 
The USAID’s projects under this scheme serve 20 out of 26 cities, including Cairo and 
Alexandria (USAID, 2012). 98% out of these foundations are Non-Governmental 
Microfinance Institutions (NGO-MFIs) that operate on a “self-sufficiency” basis to cover their 
costs and extend their outreach to other geographical areas and disenfranchised classes.  
 
The PPE program proved to be the most successful micro-lending program delivering group 
lending, particularly, for women (EFSAb, 2010). The PPE provided a maximum loan size of 
6000 L.E per borrower within a group of five. So far the outstanding loan portfolio comprised 
72,045 women.  
 
 
In 2005, the USAID in Egypt called for proposals from interested NGO-MFIs who have the 
capacity and wide network of alliances with the local businesses and other NGOs in Egypt to 
join the PPE program. Alexandria Businessmen Association, REDEC, and Assuit Business 
women Association (ABWA) were the finalists chosen to implement the project for the period 
between 2005- 2008
6
 (SANABEL, 2010). 
 
 The Social Fund for Development (SFD), a quasi-governmental entity, was founded 
in 1991 to mitigate the negative impact of structural adjustment policies and to serve as a 
safety net (Microfinance Gateway, 2005). Today, SFD continues to help alleviate poverty and 
combat unemployment.  
 
                                                 
6
 USAID operates on the basis of grants of the US government, which enables it to directly contract with NGOs 
without the requirement of a sovereign guarantee. USAID executes its microfinance programs by extending of 
refinance facilities and technical assistance both at zero costs. The refinance facility is usually placed as a USD 
guarantee deposit at a local bank and used as collateral for a commercial EGP line of credit to the NGO.  
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In this capacity, they manage the microfinance Sector, and “acts as an APEX7 organization 
that supports the creation and/or development of successful MFIs in cooperation with many 
of the aforementioned international donor agencies (mostly the USAID)” [explained by the 
SFD microfinance director in April 2011]. In addition to this role, the SFD, under Law 141 of 
the year 2004, is mandated to coordinate the SMEs’ sector in Egypt (Microfinance Gateway, 
2005). 
 
The SFD offers their partner NGO-MFIs a mixture of grants for building capacity and loans 
for microenterprises finance. Credit is given to either a start-up microenterprises at an interest 
rate of 7% or to existing microenterprises at a rate of 9 %. NGO-MFIs are allowed an interest 
spread of just 1 % to cover both risk and operating costs, which does not allow for cost 
recovery let alone to allow for growth (SANABEL, 2010). 
  
As an exception to this rule, “the NGO-MFIs operating under the PPE 
program of UNDP are not bounded by the interest cap and in addition receive 
professional technical assistance for microfinance best practice” [explained by the 
SFD microfinance director in April 2011
8
]. 
 
 
SFD and its retail lending structure face the typical sustainability risk of all SFD’s worldwide 
due to high dependency on external funding (USAIDb, 2010). Although continuous access to 
APEX finance may be a double-edged sword in motivating improved MFI financial 
performance, practitioners seem to agree that the absence of follow-up financing severely 
weakens an APEX’s ability to promote capacity building at the retail level. In this case, 
highly subsidized funding is being provided to NGO-MFIs on a first-come, first served basis, 
and borrowers will receive second loans only after all those applying for first loans are served. 
 
In 2006, the SFD joined the PPE program as a sponsor for the MFIs nominated by the USAID 
in 2005. By the end of September 2007, the ABWA received 30,086,000 L.E loans and 
2,000,000 L.E grants (for operation and fixed costs) to refinance existing microenterprises in 
Assuit city and its hamlets (ABWA, 2011).  
 
The PPE proposal sets social indicators such as percent of rural members, number of active 
borrowers, the number of training hours for loan groups, group attendance for monthly 
meetings, percent income increase for borrowers and No of loan renewals. Financial 
indicators are average annual loans outstanding, adjusted overdue rate, adjusted profits, 
subsidy dependence index (The PPE final assessment report, 2008). Nominated NGO-MFIs 
had to report the aforementioned indicators using periodical financial statements. In addition, 
they had to report their periodical “due diligence” or “snappy visits” to monitor the 
performance of micro-entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                 
7
 APEX finance is a wholesale finance to MFIs and other financial intermediaries both commercial and non-
profit. 
8
 The SFD microfinance director and USAID’s former deputy manager have been helpful to get detailed data 
about the performance of the PPE project applied by ABWA. 
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In December 2006, the SFD initiated a project for a computerised loan tracking to be adopted 
by partner NGO-MFIs and to maintain standard high quality reporting. The project was 
funded by the USAID and the final product
9
 was available for sale in early Feb 2007. 
 
 ABWA started in 2000 as an NGO-MFI founded by a group of businesswomen to 
serve the poorest microentrepreneurs in Assuit city under the patronage of the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity and according article 524 of law 141 year 2004. The association is run by an 
elected board of directors, which represents a mix of microfinance professionals. By the end 
of 2010 could finance 200,000 microenterprise with 362,129, 700 L.E. ABWA implemented 
nine microfinance projects than the PPE. ABWA is “Not-for-distributing-profit organization” 
rather than “Not-for-profit organization”, because they achieve financial surplus (but do not 
distribute profit and keep it to extend their social quest” [SFD director in March 2011].  
 
Under the PPE program, ABWA (the implementing partner), applied ready-made lending 
methodologies already pre-designed by the USAID. To win the auction, ABWA set a long 
term plan to provide group lending and develop different methodologies for peer selection, 
peer monitoring, dynamic incentives, regular repayment schedules and collateral substitutes. 
These mechanisms are supposed to help ABWA, to reach the preset social and financial 
indicators of the PPE program. Moreover, ABWA had to provide a list of potential local 
partners expected to join the PPE program. The list included commercial banks, consultancy 
and training companies, and independent auditing companies.  
 
 “Our biggest partners are Alexandria Bank, Sawiris Foundation for Social 
Development, Construction Germany Bank, Catholic Relief Service and UNICEF 
who provide us with technical as well as financial support” [ABWA’s deputy 
manager in August 2011].  
 
For example, “every February the Catholic Relief Service used to send us a 
group of financial specialist to train our loan groups on how to self-manage their 
microenterprises and maintain a good communication between the group members 
as well as with our loan officers” [ABWA’s HR manager in August 2011]. 
 
To form a loan group, 5-10 members voluntarily get-together and choose their group leader. Members 
have to be rural poor woman and have existing microenterprise each. Moreover, they have to be in 
between 18 to 60 years old, have a good credit history. And most importantly, each member has to 
submit an appropriate visibility study
10
 of her project. In addition, they have to bring their national IDs 
and sign a contract of joint responsibility against group loans. By this contract, all group members 
have to attend a monthly meeting. 
 
Once all of these conditions are fulfilled, the assigned loan officers issue a loan request and send it to 
the credit committee for approval and eligibility assessment.  Within 15 days, the committee issues a 
bank letter to enable the group members receive their loan. After the committee’s approval, groups 
receive their “log book” that includes the unit code, repayment dates and the group’s internal bylaw. 
                                                 
9
 To install this computerized information system, NGO-MFIs spend 12,000 L.E set-up cost and 1,500 
maintenance cost.  
10
 The study should not only include the business idea and required budget, but also clarify why each member 
can afford sustaining his existing project. Reasons are usually social (e.g. Having a big number of dependents, 
partner’s death).  
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All of these procedures have been set by the USAID and the SFD as standard cycle that should be 
followed for loan approval under the PPE program.  
 
Ghatak (1999) argues that peer selection can be instrumental in improving repayment rates, allowing 
for lower interest rates, and raising social welfare. His insight is that a group lending contract provides 
a way to price discriminate that is impossible with an individual lending contract. The following 
examples point to the presumed heterogeneity within the borrowers (Arora & Romijn, 2012), which is 
not true on the ground. 
 
The SFD’s director also agrees that “this peer selection assures that some 
members invest in safe business whilst other invests in risky ones. In case of 
success, risky business achieves higher returns than the safe ones and in case of 
failure some group member will be able to pay the due amount. 
 
The ABWA deputy manager confirmed and said; “peer selection results into 
classified groups who usually invest in similar microenterprises and have the same 
cultural characteristics. We simply consider each group as one”.  
 
In contrast, a borrower of ABWA said that; “The problem is that each one of 
us is investing in his own microenterprise and in some case we could not gain 
enough money to pay our instalments; We parley know each other and we do not 
do business together to jointly guarantee each other; We are just neighbours” 
[Focus group conducted in September 2011]. 
 
The PPE loan period ranges between 12-18 months. Borrowers pay 18%
11
 interest rate, 2% in 
advance and the rest gets scheduled into monthly instalments. They usually begin with 1000 
L.E each and then the loan size increases upon satisfactory repayment. Every month, groups 
have to attend in the branch to which they are affiliated to update their loan officer and pay 
their due amount. Then the payment is processed through the documentation cycle. This cycle 
shows how the accountants and others (e.g. Staff of the Management Information System 
department) process all payment data into manual as well as electronic record and report them 
periodically to the loan officers and top management. Two days is the grace period for arrears 
and if the group failed to repay the two consecutive instalments, their assigned loan officer 
reports this to the treasurer and cut off any future lending. These different mechanisms 
followed by the AWBA anticipate a stream of increasingly larger loans or what is called 
progressive lending (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). One of the loan offices explained the following 
during one of the focus groups:  
 
“There is a high mobility rate among women micro-entrepreneurs in Assuit 
and in turn we found a difficulty catching the defaulters who move across town 
trading their goats or handcrafts in some other cases. They simply come and go, 
and then they start borrowing again with a clean slate at a different branch or 
program”. 
 
ABWA’s deputy manager emphasised that group bylaws and commitment to attend monthly 
group meetings are really important to avoid the information asymmetry and trace defaulters.  
 
                                                 
11
 ABWA pays only 9% interest rate for the SFD and earn 9% to cover the administration fees in addition to 
mark up.  
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At the beginning of the PPE program, ABWA circulated a call for participation and vacancies 
to work in their existing staff. “Most of the loan officers and treasurers were anxious to join 
the new program. One year after we called for branch manager and loan officer team 
manager, but no one accepted to apply for the job” [Said by AWBA’s HR manager in 
October 2011]. In the other side, loan officers justified this by “the expected salary increase is 
far less that the spending for daily field visits, including travel and communication costs; our 
salary is poorly enough to and we could not risk taking more responsibilities”. This example 
shows that the staff incentives should match the expected task, which is difficult under 
standardised program with preset job descriptions and fixed incentives. 
 
In September 2008, the mutual agreement between the USAID, the SFD and their partner 
NGO-MFIs terminated and the PPE reached to its end with so far 72,045 micro-entrepreneurs. 
71% of the borrowers had commercial microenterprises that sell FMCGs, while the rest had 
services and agricultural businesses. This 29% started with commercial projects and when 
proved successful they ask the MFIs for bigger size loans to build other microenterprises 
(including financial leasing and mortgage finance).  
 
Our interviewees think that conflicting policies between the USAID and the SFD that have 
led to an inconsistent approach to the development of the PPEprogram and have raised 
concerns regarding the sustainability of these efforts. Moreover, “ABWA failed to maintain 
the financial sustainability in the PPE program” [said by the deputy manager of ABWA in 
August 2011].  
 
In December 2008, ABWA started its transformation to be a microfinance company 
(USAIDb, 2010).  To gain two significant benefits in transforming: (a) the ability to provide a 
variety of microfinance services besides microcredit, and (b) the increased access to funding 
whether through debt or equity. Other reasons for transforming are related to escaping current 
constraints of the NGO Law, which gives the same treatment for all NGOs regardless of their 
types of operations and sets restrictions on governance and management matters. Moreover, it 
limits the NGOs' ability to best utilize advanced computerized management and financial 
systems. And overall, to waive the obligatory approval of the MSS before accepting any fund 
from private enterprise. The first step toward this transformation was to establish its own 
commercial projects and to acquire more equity via its partnership with private enterprise 
such as Masary.Co. 
 
 
Commercial Business System in e- Masary: 
 
In this section we explain the main actors of the CI business system that built by Masary.Co at 
its early stages before lunching e-Masary BoP initiative. We draw our discussion on example 
from Masary “mobile airtime transfer services” and “real-time payment service”. See e5 that 
summarises the CI key actors. 
 
 Masary.Co aimed to tap the gap of financial inclusion in the Egyptian market using 
mobile technology as a medium of exchange that carries monetary value. They simply merged 
banking and mobile markets to transform the way unbanked Egyptians transact and finance 
their microenterprises. 
 
 23 
 
The low number of banked people motivated the company’s founders to seize the chance. 
Masary’s early pilots attributed this gap to the limited number of branches, mainstream 
reliance on cash, high transaction costs and lack of cost-effective banking solutions for the 
rural poor (Masary’s pilot, 2007). Accordingly, Masary Co saw their market opportunity in 
building contactless payment tools with affordable prices to different classes of people.  
 
During the first two years of operation, the company built strong alliances with the three 
mobile telecoms (Vodafone, Mobinil and Etisalat) to assure reliable mobile infrastructure, 
extensive retail outlet/agent networks, and to make good margins on low Average Revenue 
per User (ARPU). A potential threat at that stage was that “any of the mobile telecoms could 
launch a similar service and count on its huge capacity and reputation to beat Masary” [said 
by Masary’s CEO in March 2011]. “The challenge was to acquire all the three mobile brands 
under the umbrella of Masary’s airtime services to achieve the maximum utility of all 
telecoms” [Said by Masary’s Operation manager in March 2011].  
 
In parallel, Masary’s founders used their personal ties and business relationship to build other 
alliances with two big IT solution companies “One Card” and “Razy”. These companies 
helped Masary develop two information platforms. The first is a Web-based system (www.e-
masary.com), and the second is mobile-based system (SIM application Toolkit). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Key actors in e-Masary Commercial Business System 
 
Source: the author’s field visits 
 
Both of these systems facilitated Masary’sairtime as well as electronic payment services. In 
against, Masary’s founder invested 2,000,000 L.E in One Card shares and 1,250,000 in Razy. 
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Since then, “We outsource all system upgrades and security firewall development to Razy” 
[said by Masary’s IT manager]. In addition, “One Card batches have been allocated to 
Masary’s agents to sell them” [said by Masary’s sales manager]. Following this, Masary 
started acquiring a network of retail agent reached to 2965 outlets by Dec 2011. Each agent 
(kiosks/ supermarkets/ airtime shops) has gotten Point of Sale (POS) devices costs 800 L.E. 
This machine enables Masary’s customers to use “One Card”, a magnetic striped card to 
withdraw and deposit virtual cash. During the first two months of operation Masary acquired 
1000 agents. At that point, it was very expensive to provide all agents with POS device. 
Alternatively, agents were asked to use their own mobile phones to serve Masary’s customers. 
Once the agent is registered (using his national identification number and trading code), s/he 
gets Masary software downloaded to his mobile either in Masary headquarter or in the closest 
Masary agent. Agents who have smart phones receive SMS, including a link that 
automatically direct the user to software download and installation instructions. So, there was 
no specific handset required to install Masary’s menu. Masary’s menu is organized in both 
Arabic and English accompanied with voice commands to guide the illiterate users. 
 
At that stage, Masary could not explore the real challenges that poor customers face and how 
they make their buying decision. Masary’s marketing manager exemplified this point by 
saying that “customers were looking for the cheapest airtime offered by trusted brands; why 
they buy our airtime while telecoms’ inclusive agents (wholesalers) offer fewer prices”. In 
response, Masary had to renegotiate their deals with all mobile telecoms to get cheaper offers 
than the exclusive agents. 
 
Sooner, Masary’s management decided to scale wide and fill other market gaps. In 2010, 
Masary unleashed cross selling of products and services in between the MSPs (e.g. Coca 
Cola, Egypt Air, BNP PARIBAS and Egypt’s utilities) and with retailers. This facilitated 
different value propositions such as sending remittances home across the country and making 
electronic payments, branchless banking, and mobile microfinance services.  
 
Both of airtime and real-time payment services had short-term financial objectives than social 
objectives. Examples of Masary’s performance indicators are customer acquisition cost, 
working capital, agent acquisition costs, monthly revenue/customer, monthly revenue/ agent, 
customer daily cash in & out (Copy of Masary’s Performance appraisal provided by the HR 
manager). 
 
 Mobile telecoms: Egypt witnessed a huge increase in the number of low-income 
subscribers from 1 million to approximately 20 million during the last five years, which 
makes it an attractive market for multinational telecoms (Egypt state information service, 
2010). The latest estimates of the Egypt’s population 92.3 million that is the largest in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Ministry of information communication and technology, 
2014). 84 million out them are mobile subscribers served by the mobile network operators 
Vodafone, Mobinil and Etisalat (Ministry of information communication and technology, 
2014). The year 2013 witnessed 99.7 million subscribers and 118.19% penetration rate 
(Mohamad, 2011; Mohamad et al., , 2014). 
 
Mobinil is an Egyptian multinational telecom founded in 1998. Since then, Mobinil has 
strived to maintain a growing market share. However, Vodafone joined the market in the 
same year and replicated the worldwide experience of Vodafone group in the Egyptian 
market. Mobinil still serves 45% of the mobile subscribers in Egypt and provide the highest 
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quality mobile telecommunication services to the upper and middle classes (NTRA, 2010). 
Vodafone’s core advantage is providing 3G, ADSL interned broadband services for upper 
income class. Because of that, Vodafone has the largest services revenue market share 62 % 
(American chamber in Egypt, 2011).  
 
For a decade, poor users have been neglected as a target market for mobile telecoms in Egypt. 
Not until, Etisalat, a MNC based on UAE, poor customer have been recognized a latent 
market. Then the race started among the three telecoms to serve that market. Telecoms offer 
only prepaid services. Dealing with Masary.Co, receive assigned monthly quota (with 4% 
discount) from airtime and virtual money. Before lunching e-Masary wallet, Masary.Co used 
to pay in advance (prepaid) then they manage their own investment portfolio. Asking about 
the main motive for telecoms to joint Masary.Co; Vodafone marketing manager said “Why 
not? Masary agents are everywhere and they have access to uncovered market segments”. 
Further, Vodafone’s CFO said “mobile payment and remittances are the only way to 
differentiate our brand and scale intro a completely new market”   
 
Telecoms use these quotas to control Masary’s price escalating that threat their exclusive 
agents. Telecoms also provide tangible and intangible support to Masary’s staff. For example, 
Etisalat provided all staff training programs, technical specialists and motorcycles to Masary’s 
distinguished agents. By the end of each year, Etisalat celebrate Masary’s agents and provide 
them tangible incentives. 
 
Concluding this section, we argue that Masary.Co as an implementing partner uncovered new 
market opportunities and experimented inclusive embedded business models to improve the 
financial inclusion. In doing so, they conducted many partnerships with non-traditional 
partners (e.g. Mobile telecoms) who usually work outside the banking industry. Finally, 
Masary is still growing (20 million L.E/12% sales increases by the end of 2010) despite their 
small investment and endless market challenges (Egypt Finance, 14
th
 October 2010).  
 
 
BOP PERSPECTIVE AND ESTABLISHING CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIONS 
IN E-MASARY 
 
Masary.Co launched its first microfinance initiative in partnership with eight MFIs (See table 
2 below). They are located in eight different cities where financial inclusion recorded the 
lowest levels for microentrepreneurs. Through this partnership Masary.Co provide loans for 
the young micro-entrepreneurs, mobile loan tracking, and e-wallet services.  
 
 
TABLE 2 
Partner NGO-MFIs in e-Masary initiative 
 Name of MFIs Location Key Sources of fund 
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Mawada Organization for Community 
Development 
Kafr El-
Shiek 
Self-fund & 
Donations from Masary Co 
Dakahlya Businessmen’s Association for 
Community Development 
Dakahlya Ford Foundation 
& 
The Egyptian Swiss Development 
Fund 
EL-Basaysa Association Sharkiya SFD & 
The Canadian International 
Development Agency 
REDEC Association Beni-Suef SFD & USAID 
Assuit Business woman Association Assuit SFD& USAID 
Sana Association Sohag SFD 
Feda Association Qena SFD 
Egyptian Family Development Foundation Aswan SFD 
 
Source: the author’s field visits 
To deliver such services, the company integrated their PI and CI networks and their adhered 
business systems. This mutual collaboration between donors and their implementing partner 
on one side, and the private enterprise and its network on the other side mixes the commercial 
chain with the microfinance chain and links between micro-entrepreneurs and the financial 
system.  
 
ABWA is the most successful NGO-MFI out of the aforementioned eight. Through this 
partnership, ABWA was able to take advantage of Masary’s mobile payment service to track 
loan payments, disbursements and repayments in real-time and also expand its client base. In 
June 2011, the Central Bank of Egypt allowed mobile transfer up to EP 3000 (USD 505) per 
day via mobile phones (IFC, 2012). As a result of this approval, Masary’s e-wallet service is 
likely to expand in many fields. The rest of our discussion draws examples from the 
interaction between the above mentioned networks. 
 
 
 
Balance metrics and align incentives 
 
E-Masary BoP network creates mutual value for telecoms, SFD, ABWA, and 
microentrepreneurs. While Masary.Co and telecoms generate economic returns, they create 
social value for the micro-entrepreneurs and other local stakeholders. This win-win situation 
maintains the project’s sustainability (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002).  
 
In mobile airtime top-up for example, Masary.Co relies more on the performance of their 
sales representatives and retail agents to expand Masary’s brand and increase the company’s 
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sales. So the company develops monthly training programs for both reps and agents to get 
more sales and marketing skills. Then each of them had to achieve a minimum monthly 
target. However, Masary management did not realize that their sales reps focus their efforts to 
sell to one or two big wholesalers than to spend more time and money to get to the poor 
community in villages and hamlets. Despite that Masary service was intended to link the 
disenfranchised, in reality it links the more banked people.  
 
To develop a BoP business system, a balanced scorecard is essential to capture relevant 
information about the economic returns and social impact. Capturing the financial indicators 
is a routine for private companies, but measuring the local social impact is a challenge. The 
actors of the PIs and the local community possess knowledge about the local effectiveness, 
efficiency impacts, and pest practices of financial inclusion. This customer-level data 
represents a source of indigenous knowledge that complements the Anglo-Saxon financial 
matrices developed by the CI. During the pilot stage, the CIs use this data to create inclusive 
business models in a way that best meets microentrepreneurs’ needs. For instance, Masary.Co 
allied with the SFD to set valid social indicators for mobile microfinance services, and 
transform them into a mobile-based questionnaire. In doing so, the customer receives an 
automatic phone call after conducting each transaction. “This electronic questionnaire helps 
the partner NGO-MFIs to get a feedback loop about customers’ social indicators such as the 
assets building capacity, the income increase, the education level, number of dependants and 
the essential production inputs for their microenterprises” [Said by the AWBA’s deputy 
manager in August 2011]. However, “this represents extra training and development cost for 
Masary.Co to facilitate using the service by staff and customers. Masary.Co had to develop a 
voice command questionnaire that operates in the local Arabic dialect and also offer routine 
training programs for their sales operators, loan officers, and borrowers”[Said by Masary’s 
business development manager in April 2011]. New services have associated risks and failure 
chances. Nevertheless, Masary learn from these risks and failures to improve their 
experimented business models during the design and deployment stages.  
 
Once appropriate metrics are developed, a track of lessons and best practices (for both of the 
financial and social domain) can be accessible for all parties using an authorised password for 
e-Masary grid. This grid is an “online Balanced Scorecard” that holds real-time data for all 
direct stakeholders. It has been developed by a team of IT specialist from Masary, ABWA 
and the SFD. The blueprint of this grid was drawn from “GIRAFE Scorecard” 12. GIRAFE is 
an innovative and analytical methodology developed by PlaNet finance to assess the 
performance and institutional risks of financial inclusion projects. It addresses the project 
“Governance” including issues of decision making, planning, and HR management. 
“Information system design and bid data analytics” is the second elements of this 
methodology. This element covers the human computer interaction, data modelling, minimum 
system requirements, and programing languages. “Risk management” is the third element, 
which traces the documentation cycle, internal controls, and auditing reports. The fourth 
element, or “Activities”, covers technical issues of the financial service management such as 
credit risk, portfolio risk, and credit coverage. The fifth element is “Funding and liquidity 
                                                 
12
 There are other two commonly used performance scorecards for financial inclusion initiatives in Egypt: the 
first is the “Camel system” that was originally proposed to manage the performance of the American Federal 
Bank and then has been adopted by the microfinance regulators; and the second is the “PEARL system” that 
was developed in Uganda to measure the performance of women-focused microfinance programs. 
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ratios” that highlights the capital adequacy, liquidity and market risks. The final element 
concerns with the “Efficiency and profitability ratios” 
By the end of the year 2009, the SFD director who is also a senior analyst in PlaNet finance 
mandated a team of PlaNet finance specialist to train Masary’s staff on how to follow the 
GIRAFFE system and feed it on the grid. Masary.Co also recruited 30 researchers from the 
ministry of social solidarity to fulfil the same purpose.  The pilot succeeded and resulted in 
detailed socio-financial scorecard for e-Masary grid. Examples of its social indicators are an 
efficient use to I-Score and credit bureau, staff incentives, and staff communication. Other 
indicators are client-related such as prevention of over indebtedness, respectful treatment, No 
of complaints and privacy. Furthermore, there are governance and regulatory indicators like 
internal audit and quality of performance reporting. Developing a socially oriented metrics 
expands beyond technical and financial indicators (e.g. Infrastructure and budget). Rather, it 
should be tied to the local impacts that the private enterprises and their local partners are 
encouraged to deliver. The social indicators are usually long-run and concerns with the 
effectiveness of financing microentrepreneurs toward their wellbeing and poverty alleviation.  
 
After developing this grid, the Central Bank of Egypt could find a potential for controllable 
and secure mobile money system. In turn, a detailed mobile money regulators framework has 
been issued in consistent with the socioeconomic indicators on GIRAFFE system (Central 
Bank of Egypt, 2011). This is a clear example of overcoming the regulatory barriers using the 
BoP business system.  
 
The employees’ incentives should align with the overall performance measures. For instance, 
Masary’s operators, retail agents, and loan officers had to be designed in consistent with the 
performance measures set in the grid to improve their job satisfaction and quality of life 
(Mumford, 2006).  Appropriate incentives include not only promotions, salary increase, or a 
higher commission, but also social incentives such as training, business advice, and job 
empowerment to conduct new transactions for new customers. Hughes & Lonie (2007) 
confirm that the mobile money agents carry more responsibility and credit risks than the 
normal airtime agents, while take less commission and restricted to work in the slum areas.  
To enhance these long-term social indicators, a bonus pool could be saved to reimburse (or 
reallocate) the compensations for those who contribute more towards the long-term socio-
financial indicators. At the end of this section, we argue that the balanced performance 
metrics show how the BoP business system facilitates embedded business models. However, 
does it help escalating investments even when success is limited during the pilot stage? This 
is what we discuss in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
Create Flexibility: 
 
Integrating the philanthropic and commercial business system requires building flexible 
partnership platforms. This BoP business system embraces the need for trial and error as the 
actors proceed throughout the design and deployment stages. It also requires inclusive work to 
escalate the dedicated investment and efforts to harvest fruition in the long-run. In our e-
Masary case, for instance, the mobile network operators did not fully trust Masary’s 
capabilities to expand in the unbanked area and pay back the full amount of the airtime. 
Prepaid airtime is the standard way the telecoms use to sell their service and it was difficult 
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for them to change to credit unless Masary. Co makes inclusive, sustainable business model to 
enhance the telecoms diversity and penetration in the Egyptian market. The telecoms consider 
electronic money as an investment that should start small and scalable-up with the 
profitability and liquidity performance. Not until late 2013, the mobile operator saw the 
strong potential for full mobile money services and the worth of the new credit policy. To 
gain such a trust Masary.Co kept an equal distance with the three network operators to 
escalate their support and business alliance. 
 
Implementing e-Masary projects required learning rather than execution. Thus, at this stage, 
Masary.Co negotiated flexible support from the donors (i.e. SFD and USAID) and mobile 
network operators. Flexibility is usually in the types of resources and the length of that 
support. Different types of support at different stages of development. Actors in the PI (The 
SFD, USAID and NGO-MFIs) provided Masary.Co with knowledge and experience as well 
as access to the poor market. This knowledge includes strategies on how organizational issues 
such as build trust with the local communities, and technical issues like selecting loan groups 
and lending cycle. Both the organizational and technical strategies help “overcoming 
infrastructure and profitability” challenges as discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
The PI network in e-Masary also had strong business relations with banks and training 
companies, which paved the way in front of the company.  
 
In addition to type, the timing of supporting resources should not be predetermined. The 
donors and sponsors should not set a certain amount of resources each year. Private 
enterprises start with a low cost investment to maximize the returns from a learning 
orientation. Then they need to be capitalized for scaling-up. Once business model is 
investment ready, donors and sponsors can facilitate a greater investment. The timing and 
success of these developments, however, are difficult to predict in advance. Masary.Co 
required access to modest amounts of subsidized capital to facilitate experimentation. But 
once, their pilot proved economically feasible, the telecoms as well as the donors scaled-up 
their investments in building infrastructures for the unbanked areas and sponsoring point-of 
sale machines with Masary’s trade mark.  
 
 
As such, PIs support during the deployment stage requires a willingness to accept learning 
outcomes and a long-term orientation as part of their metrics. Not all new business models, 
for instance, will be worthy of additional investment. Only high-potential ones should be 
expanded by committing additional resources. The less successful ones should be stopped or 
redirected. These failures can generate learning, but the PIs investment is non-recoverable. 
Trying to accurately predict in advance which models will be worthy of investment, the type 
and amount of investment needed, and timing for these investments is challenging and likely 
to be inaccurate. 
 
 
Embedded Innovation and competitive advantage 
 
In the future, competitive advantage will depend more upon the capacity to generate 
disruptive innovation and creative destruction through competitive imagination and 
legitimacy, and to integrate stakeholder interests to create value on multiple fronts (i.e., 
Synergistic value creation) (March, 1991). By doing so, it is argued that firms can improve 
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customer loyalty, build transformational customer-supplier relationships, lower employee 
turnover, and improved reputation (Berman et al., 1999). 
 
Based on the case of e-Masary, we found it challenging to manage stakeholder concerns while 
some of them are more important than the others and have control over critical resources or 
centrality in a network. Only in cases of threats (e.g. New legal rule or market pressure) 
stakeholder unite and change the way they collaborate. By then, they achieve emerging or 
transformational change.  
 
Then Masary.Co experimented new value propositions for mobile payment, microfinance, 
and transfers throughout  stakeholders’ involvement in creating new values, designing new 
services, and  presenting a sustainable (long-run) initiative for financial inclusion. 
 
To be competitive the partners need to manage radical uncertainty by exchanging knowledge 
among each other and with the community. Knowledge from diverse and dispersed 
heterogeneous stakeholders, many of whom may be adversarial (e.g. Regulators and bankers), 
prevents the surprise emergence of threats (Hart & Sharma, 2004). 
 
To scale-up, BoP ventures (like all ventures with a goal of long-term self-sufficiency) must 
create and sustain competitive advantage. But because these ventures must straddle the border 
between the formal and informal economies, they face unique challenges in generating that 
competitive advantage. Unlike businesses operating solely in the formal economy, BoP 
venture leaders cannot rely on establishing competitive advantage based on investments made 
within and secured by the firm’s protective boundaries or by a country’s legal system. 
Businesses operating in the informal economy must accept the possibility of copyright 
infringement, the presence of counterfeiters, a limited ability to enforce contractual terms, and 
the prospect of product adulteration (Hernando, 2000).  
 
Unlike businesses operating solely in the informal economy, BoP ventures cannot rely on a 
strategy that primarily depends on extracting value already present in these markets, such as 
accessing locally-available expertise or utilizing pre-existing infrastructure. These assets may 
be limited, and also available to other competing firms. Common availability levels the 
playing field, and nearly all local businesses that operate in the informal economy remain 
small (Banerjee & Dufflo, 2007). 
 
A good example of innovating new services and creating a competitive advantage is I-Score 
services in e-Masary. I-Score is a credit rating service normally available in the “I-Score 
credit bureau” that costs 30 L.E per borrower. The service is currently available for e-
Masary’s partner NGO-MFIs to investigate the credibility of borrowers and discover double 
borrowing. The idea of this service aroused out of the social interaction between NGO-MFIs 
and their customers that could threat e-Masary’s long term sustainability. Due to the mobility 
nature of e-Masary wallet, many borrowers could escape with their loans and never paid back 
their loans. In response, Masary Co (with the help of the SFD) invented a central online 
platform that links all member NGO-MFIs with each other and with the banking system.  
 
In 2011, Masary developed “the Network of Egyptian MFIs” in which all member MFIs pays 
only 5 L.E to investigate the credit history of each new client. This reduced price is more 
reasonable for microloans. As said by a loan officer, “ It is not fair to pay 30 L.E to test the 
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eligibility of  a small amount of loan; adding 30 L.E. to 2% nonreturnable advance payment 
discouraged many of our clients to join”. 
CONCLUSION 
Market-based business system contributed towards addressing the challenges of financial 
inclusion. On one side, the philanthropic business system focuses on the opportunity to better 
connect local producers to domestic and international markets. On the other side, the 
commercial business system focuses on the creating new opportunities via embedded (and 
inclusive) business in which different stakeholder can contribute the most. Both the donor 
community and private corporations have developed value chains, infrastructure, and value 
propositions to work more closely with local producers. The philanthropic and commercial 
business systems have different pros and cons as they move through the design, deployment, 
and sustainability stages. While these approaches are complementary and may be trying to 
achieve the same outcome, donors and enterprises have largely preferred to maintain their 
independence from one another. 
 
Using the BoP business system, we present a governance model for developing inclusiveness 
and cross-sector collaboration to integrate investments in PIs and CIs. In particular, we 
propose several strategies that private corporations can use to enhance collaborative 
interdependence between the two sectors. Variation in context may influence the prioritization 
and sequencing of these strategies. These strategies build a partnership mechanism that draws 
the strengths of each sector and provides insight for a business system that can facilitate 
stronger connections between profits and financial inclusion as a tool for poverty alleviation. 
 
Analysing data from e-Masary case pinpointed to online balanced scorecard,  investment 
flexibility, embedded innovation and inclusive competitive advantage as key results. The 
online grid facilitates collecting relevant and real-time information about economic returns, 
social benefits and local impact. It also helps to reconcile the staff incentives with the 
socioeconomic measures of the overall project performance. The latter element sustains the 
employee engagement with the poor micro-entrepreneurs. Flexibility in fulfilling long term 
financial commitments and building an innovation value chain was also significant. For 
financial commitments during the design stage, donors may rely on building business 
intimacy with a larger set of enterprises and focus on sharing knowledge and resources. Then 
in later stages (long run) they may select a smaller number of partners who have access to 
more resources and willingness to provide greater financial support, extended interactions, 
and detailed technical assistance. The embedded business model needs trial and error, 
particularly in the design and deployment stages and also needs that long term financial and 
technical support to reduce the risk.  We found that engaging the poor micro-entrepreneurs in 
the design and deployment stages reduces error and improve the sustainability. Our findings, 
then show a potential for overcoming the challenges of financing the BoP using mobile 
financial services. 
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